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I. INTRODUCTION
State constitutions often provide much stronger and more
complete protection for fundamental human rights than does
the United States Constitution.' Paradoxically, however, more
judicial and scholarly effort has been devoted to divining the
meaning and scope of the United States Bill of Rights than has
been expended on all fifty state bills of rights combined. This
trend has been especially pronounced in certain "core areas"
relating to the rights of free speech and press. The limited pro-
tection provided to freedom of expression in the federal Consti-
tution has so overshadowed the corresponding and often
stronger state constitutional guarantees that freedom of expres-
sion is almost universally referred to as a "first amendment"
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My appreciation is expressed to Lourene Miovski, my intern and a student at the
University of Puget Sound School of Law, for her tireless and extensive work and contri-
butions to this Article. Mark Eibert and Kay Frank, my law clerks, also made valuable
contributions. Professors Robert Williams of Rutgers University and Charles Corker of
the University of Washington made comments that were appreciated and incorporated
into this Article. My administrative assistant, Virginia Murry, has contributed many
hours in preparation of this manuscript and her efforts were, as always, invaluable.
1. See, e.g., State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 699-700, 674 P.2d 1240, 1247-48
(1983) (search of vehicles unconstitutional under Washington State Constitution while
probably constitutional under United States Constitution); Alderwood Assocs. v. Wash-
ington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 246, 635 P.2d 108, 117 (1981) (Washington State
Constitution provides greater speech rights on private property than does first amend-
ment of United States Constitution). See also Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23
Cal. 3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d 341, 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (1979) (California Constitu-
tion provides broader speech rights than does the United States Constitution), aff'd, 447
U.S. 74 (1980); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 491 (1977); Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System:
Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 491, 493 (1984).
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right.2 One unfortunate consequence of the excessive emphasis
on the federal Bill of Rights, however, is that it has led many
lawyers and judges to assume, with little evidence or analysis,
that state constitutions are bound by the same constraints that
the founders of our nation chose to incorporate into the federal
Constitution.
This Article makes no such assumptions. Instead, it
presents an independent analysis of a fundamental aspect of the
free speech provision of the Washington Declaration of Rights,
which closely resembles the free speech provisions of many other
state constitutions.' The focus is on whether the Washington
free speech provision protects Washingtonians against abridg-
ment of their speech and press rights by private individuals and
organizations. To answer this question, this Article examines the
nature of state constitutions and government, the case law of
other jurisdictions interpreting similar provisions, the text of the
Washington provision, the origins of the provision, the historical
background of the Washington Constitutional Convention,
Washington case law, current social values, and public policy
considerations. Analysis of these factors reveals that the Wash-
ington Constitution can, was intended to, and does protect free
speech rights against many forms of abridgment by private indi-
viduals and organizations.
4
II. THE FEDERAL "STATE ACTION" DOCTRINE
To understand the importance of state constitutional pro-
2. In this Article such rights will be referred to as "free speech" rights or "freedom
of expression," terms that are intended to encompass all the speech and press rights
guaranteed by the 50 state constitutions and by the federal Constitution.
3. Note, Freedom of Expression Under State Constitutions, 20 STAN. L. REV. 318,
318 n.2 (1968) (constitutional free speech provisions in 38 states are at least partially
identical to Washington's); Note, Free Speech, the Private Employee, and State Consti-
tutions, 91 YALE L.J. 522, 541 n.94 (1982) (free speech provisions in 41 state constitu-
tions conform to the New York model, which is nearly identical to the Washington provi-
sion) [hereinafter cited as Note, Free Speech]; Note, Private Abridgment of Speech and
the State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 165, 180 n.79 (1980) (listing 43 state constitutional
free speech provisions that are "linguistically similar" to the California and Washington
affirmative free speech guarantees) [hereinafter cited as Note, Private Abridgment].
4. There are many other potential sources of evidence regarding the meaning and
scope of a state constitutional provision. See Utter, supra note 1, at 508-24. Not all
potential sources, however, exist or can be located for every provision of every state con-
stitution. For instance, Washington's enabling act was silent on the subject of freedom of
expression, and none of the members of the Preamble and Declaration of Rights Com-
mittee of the Washington Constitutional Convention appears to have written any articles
relevant to the state free speech provision. Id. at 510-11, 512, 513.
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tection against private abridgment of fundamental rights, one
must examine the federal "state action" doctrine. The language
of the first and fourteenth amendments' to the United States
Constitution indicates a clear intent to protect speech rights
only against abridgment by the federal and state governments,6
although the framers may have intended otherwise.' State action
was recognized first as a prerequisite for a cause of action under
the fourteenth amendment in the Civil Rights Cases in 1883.8
Since then, the federal courts have adopted various theories
under which essentially private activities have been deemed to
be "state action"9 and, consequently, subject to constitutional
limitations. These theories, which the federal courts have gradu-
ally restricted to very narrow applications, find "state action"
when a private actor performs a traditional and exclusively pub-
lic function, acts under government command or encouragement,
or is significantly entwined with the government in some
fashion. 0
The public function doctrine requires that the private per-
son or entity be engaged in an activity that is a traditional and
exclusive function of government." The United States Supreme
5. The first amendment states: "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press ...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The fourteenth amendment provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (Court held that Congress had
exceeded its powers in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1875 because § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment, which authorized enforcement of § 1, could not go beyond § 1, which was
limited to enforcing the prohibition against state actions that deprived persons of rights).
7. See generally H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908);
J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (1965); Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding
of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REV. 13 (1950).
8. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
9. As used in this Article, "state action" and state action have two different mean-
ings. "State action" refers to a private entity's action that is considered equivalent to
action by the state because of the private entity's function or relationship with the state.
State action, without quotation marks, designates action by governmental bodies or gov-
ernmental officials.
10. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 497-525
(2d ed. 1983); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1147-1174 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
For a more detailed analysis of the development of the "state action" doctrine, see
Skover, The Washington Constitutional "State Action" Doctrine: A Fundamental Right
to State Action, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 221 (1985).
11. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-58 (1978) (no "state action" found when
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Court has expressly refused to expand the narrow public func-
tion doctrine to include any private actor who opens his or her
property to the public.1" Yet, in Marsh v. Alabama,"3 the Court
seemed to imply such an expansion, noting that "the more an
owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed
by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it." 4
In Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley
Plaza,5 the Court applied Marsh to protect a union's right to
picket a private business, emphasizing both that the private
property was open to the public"6 and that the property was the
functional equivalent of a business district.1 7 In Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner,8 however, the Court repudiated the expansive interpre-
tation of the public function doctrine suggested by the Marsh
and Logan Valley decisions:
There is some language in Logan Valley, unnecessary to the
decision, suggesting that the key focus of Marsh was upon the
"business district," and that whenever a privately owned busi-
ness district serves the public generally its sidewalks and
streets become the functional equivalents of similar public
facilities .. . .[Tlhis would be an incorrect interpretation of
the Court's decision in Marsh."
Thus, although the United States Supreme Court may have
briefly recognized a broader "public place" theory of state action
in the past, the current public function doctrine seems to be
narrowly limited to such clearly governmental activities as the
management of elections20 and the maintenance of company
warehouse owner invoked a statute to sell stored goods to cover storage costs).
12. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518-20 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551, 562 (1972).
13. 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (restrictions on distributing religious literature in company
town invalid under first and fourteenth amendments).
14. Id. at 506.
15. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
16. Id. at 318.
17. Id. at 318-19.
18. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
19. Id. at 562. Accord Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976) (no first amend-
ment right to enter private shopping center to advertise a strike against an employer in
the center).
20. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 470 (1953) (political association created to deny
blacks the right to vote invalid under fourteenth and fifteenth amendments); Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88 (1932) (limitation of political party membership to whites inva-
lid under fourteenth amendment).
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towns.2
The United States Supreme Court has also determined that
when legislation compels or encourages certain private activity,
the private activity may be characterized as "state action. '22
Similarly, the Court has held that when a judge commands a
private person to honor a will or contract, such private activity
may also be considered "state action."2 3 Recently, however, the
Court has neglected and narrowed,24 though not entirely aban-
doned,25 these theories.'
When significant entwinement exists between the govern-
ment and a private entity, the Court has sometimes held that
actions by the private entity constitute "state action. '26 More
recent cases, however, greatly restrict application of this doc-
trine. For instance, the Court once intimated that government
licensing and regulation of private entities would be sufficient to
subject the private entity to constitutional restraints,27 but sub-
sequent cases have consistently held that government licensing
21. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946). The United States Supreme Court
has rejected arguments that public utilities, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 358 (1974), and nursing homes, Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1003 (1982),
perform public functions. The Court has also held that dispute resolution between debt-
ors and creditors is not a traditional and exclusive governmental function. Flagg Bros. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 161 (1978).
22. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 379 (1967) (striking down a state
constitutional amendment repealing fair-housing laws because it encouraged
discrimination).
23. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966) (enforcement of a will providing
lands to establish a racially restricted park under the trusteeship of a city held to consti-
tute "state action"); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18 (1948) (holding enforcement of a
racially restrictive covenant to constitute "state action").
24. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 166 (1978) (no "state action" when
a warehouse owner relied on a statute to sell customer's stored goods to pay for storage
charges); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226 (1971) (no encouragement and, there-
fore, no "state action" when a city closed its public pool in response to a desegregation
order); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 445 (1970) (allowing land, established by will as a
racially restricted park, to revert to heirs rather than requiring it to be used without
racial restriction).
25. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982) (when an oil company
sued to recover a debt and obtained a prejudgment attachment that was later found to
be unconstitutional, the court's authorization and supervision of the attachment caused
the oil company's actions to constitute "state action").
26. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724-26 (1961) (because
both government and restaurant benefited from restaurant's location in government
building, the restaurant's discriminatory actions created a cause of action under the four-
teenth amendment).
27. See Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461-63 (1952) (permitting
radios on street cars in the District of Columbia held to be federal government action
under first and fifth amendments).
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and regulation alone are insufficient to imply "state action,""8
unless the government directly causes or is connected with the
challenged practice.2 9 When the government has subsidized a
private entity, the Court has been inconsistent, finding "state
action" in some cases3" but not in others.3" If the affairs of gov-
ernment and a private entity were entwined for the economic
benefit of both, the Court previously found the entity's acts to
constitute "state action," 2 but more recently, the Court has
refused to extend constitutional protections in similar
situations. 33
The United States Supreme Court has apparently curtailed
substantially the doctrines that may be used to apply federal
constitutional restraints to private conduct. Even in situations in
which constitutional protections were previously theoretically
available, the federal courts have displayed increasing reluctance
to apply such protection when activities of nongovernmental
persons or entities are concerned. This reluctance has led some
state courts and commentators to ask whether state constitu-
tions are subject to similar state action limitations, or whether
state constitutions may serve to restrain directly any person
from infringing on another's fundamental rights.
28. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1003 (1982) (reduction of benefits by pri-
vate nursing homes receiving state funds not "state action" without encouragement by
state); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974) (termination of elec-
trical service by private utility not "state action" simply because of state regulation);
Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114 (1973) (refusal
to broadcast paid editorial advertisements not "state action" solely because of federal
licensing); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171 (1962) (grant of liquor license
to racially discriminatory private club not "state action" because state did not intend to
discriminate).
29. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
30. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 468 (1973) (striking down a program
granting books to students who attended racially discriminatory schools because such
assistance would aid and encourage discrimination).
31. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1003 (1982) (no "state action" in the discharge
of patients from a nursing home even though both patients and facility received state
funds); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982) (no "state action" in the dis-
charge of employees from a private school even though virtually all of the school's
income was derived from government funding).
32. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 309 (1966) ("state action" when a city acted
as a trustee for a racially restricted park); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715, 724-26 (1961) (holding that actions of a restaurant owner constituted "state action"
because owner leased space in a government building, benefiting from the patronage of
government workers and from the building's tax-exempt status and because the govern-
ment benefited from having the income from the restaurant's rent).
33. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974).
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III. THE NATURE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNMENTS
State constitutions and governments are not subject to the
same inherent constraints that prevent the federal Constitution
and government from protecting individual rights from private
abridgment. 4 The United States Constitution is a limited grant
of power, authorizing the federal government to exercise only
those powers that have been expressly or impliedly delegated to
it in the Constitution.3 5 When any branch of the federal govern-
ment acts, it must rely on an enumerated power to make its acts
constitutional. 36
State constitutions, on the other hand, serve as limitations
on the otherwise plenary power of state governments, which can
do anything that is not expressly forbidden by the state consti-
tution or by federal law.37 Because it is not generally forbidden,
34. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10-13, 17-18 (1883) (fourteenth amend-
ment held to prohibit state discrimination, but not private discrimination); Alderwood
Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 242-43, 635 P.2d 108, 115-16
(1981) (fourteenth amendment "state action" analysis not required by language of the
Washington State Constitution); Note, Free Speech, supra note 3, at 542 n.95.
35. Utter, supra note 1, at 494-95 (footnotes omitted) (citing Fain v. Chapman, 89
Wash. 2d 48, 53, 569 P.2d 1135, 1139 (1977), and cases cited therein). See, e.g., Union
High School Dist. No. 1 v. Taxpayers of Union High School, 26 Wash. 2d 1, 7, 172 P.2d
591, 594 (1946) (Washington State Constitution considered a limitation on legislative
power, distinguished from the federal Constitution grant of power).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63 (1936); United States v. Cruik-
shank, 92 U.S. 542, 551 (1875). This requirement historically has prevented Congress
from regulating much private action. See James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 142 (1903)
(civil rights legislation invalidated because the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments
authorized only legislation that affected state action); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
10-11 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1882) (no private action under
fourteenth amendment for conspiracy to deprive citizens of equal protection).
However, recent broad interpretations of Congress' enumerated powers have enabled
Congress to use its commerce, taxing, and spending authority to protect individual rights
against private abridgment. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)-
(h) (1978 & Supp. 1984); National Labor Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197
(1975); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982). See
also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968). Cf. Civil Rights Act of 1866,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1978) (protecting the right to contract and the right to inherit,
purchase, hold, and convey property against private action based on the thirteenth
amendment).
37. See, e.g., Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n, 35 Wash. 2d 1, 7, 211 P.2d 651, 656 (1949)
(cigarette tax not prohibited by Washington State Constitution, thus within power of the
legislature); State ex rel. Billington v. Sinclair, 28 Wash. 2d 575, 583, 183 P.2d 813, 817
(1947) (regulation of city charters within legislative powers); James v. McMillan, 113
Wash. 644, 652-53, 194 P. 823, 826 (1921) (calculation of county officers' salaries within
legislative powers). This principle was generally recognized in 1889. The Tacoma Daily
Ledger noted that bills of rights "are more important to state governments which are
governments of general powers-vested by the people of the union with all such powers
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states have always had the power to regulate private conduct.38
The use of this power to grant citizens constitutional rights
against other private individuals and corporations was well
accepted in both theory and fact by the time the Washington
Constitution was adopted in 1889.39 One scholar who researched
the Washington Constitutional Convention early in this century
noted that although regulation of private conduct was not within
the "legitimate province" of the federal Constitution, it was
often included in state constitutions.4 °
This concept was recognized and repeated in various forms
by the newspapers that covered the convention. One newspaper
as they had to give except where the contrary was expressed ...or implied." Tacoma
Daily Ledger, June 6, 1889, at 2, col. 1. See infra note 136. Further, nothing in the Wash-
ington Constitution generally, or in art. I, § 2 specifically prohibits the state from enforc-
ing the free speech provision against the private sector. See infra text section V.
38. See Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Department of Ecology, 88 Wash. 2d 726, 729-
30, 565 P.2d 1162, 1164 (1977) (prohibition of structures built on a floodway); State v.
Dexter, 32 Wash. 2d 551, 554, 202 P.2d 906, 907 (1947) (regulation of reforestation prac-
tices). See also generally E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER, PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHTS (1904); A. RUSSELL, THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE (1900); 1 C.
TIEDEMAN, STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY (1900).
39. See F. STIMSON, THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES 68-72 (1908); Utter, supra note 1, at 496; Developments in the
Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REV. 983, 1058
n.26 (1963). This principle was well known to the delegates at the Washington Constitu-
tional Convention. See, e.g., Knapp, The Origin of the Constitution of the State of
Washington, 4 WASH. HIST. Q. 227, 230 (1913) (thesis based on interviews with delegates
to the Washington Constitutional Convention). Some observers criticized the delegates
for including too much "legislation" in the constitution. See id. at 228. See also Thorpe,
Washington and Montana: Have They Made a Mistake in Their Constitutions?, CEN-
TURY MAGAZINE, Feb. 1890, at 504-05; Yakima Herald, Aug. 1, 1889, at 2, col. 2. But many
contemporary newspapers and groups urged the delegates to regulate private conduct
constitutionally. E.g., Tacoma Daily Ledger, July 27, 1889, at 2, col. 2 (urging a constitu-
tional provision making corporations and private enterprises that are "affected with a
public interest subject to legislative control"); Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 5, 1889, at
3, col. 1 (urging state constitutional regulation of various private corporate activities and
property and contract rights); Seattle Post-Intelligencer, May 31, 1889, at 4, col. 1
(repeating "the commonplace remark that this constitution, when approved by the peo-
ple, will bind not only individuals but the people's representatives in legislation").
40. Constitutions are supposed to be bodies of laws by which government is
constituted and given its organization and foundation. The regulation of the
relation of citizens in their private capacity does not fall within their legitimate
province. The principle is fully recognized in the construction of our federal
Constitution, which is strong and flexible because of its admirable simplicity
and its strictly constitutional scope. Constitution making in the states has
proceeded upon no such idea.
Knapp, supra note 39, at 230 (emphasis added). But cf. id., at 234 (careful consideration
of state constitutions reveals that they contain safeguards against legislative encroach-
ment on private rights).
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stated: "The commonplace remark that this constitution when
approved by the people, will bind not only individuals but the
people's representatives in legislation cannot be repeated too
often .... ,41 Similarly, another observed that "[tlhe people of
the United States are dependent upon their respective state gov-
ernments for the protection of life, liberty, property, and the
enjoyment of social, political and religious privileges. '
4 2
By 1889 numerous ,state constitutions contained provisions
regulating private conduct. These included provisions prohibit-
ing slavery,43 outlawing imprisonment for private debts," and
granting individuals the right to compel other individuals to tes-
tify in criminal trials.4 5 The North Dakota Constitution out-
lawed the apparently common employer practice of blacklisting
41. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, May 31, 1889, at 4, col. 1 (emphasis added). The Post-
Intelligencer also stated:
[t]o preserve and secure to every individual the largest liberty that is compati-
ble with the good order of society, and the advance of the whole community
along legitimate paths to the highest realization of civilized life, is the central
thought of a well considered constitution, and the object of constitutional
government.
Id.
42. Tacoma Daily Ledger, July 19, 1889, at 3, col. 1. The Ledger also stated that
"[g]overnments . . . have been formed to protect the weak against the strong in the
pursuit of life, liberty and property," id., Aug. 2, 1889, at 4, col. 1, and that the state's
"business is to protect each and every individual in the enjoyment of his rights and
property." Id., July 6, 1889, at 2, col. 1.
43. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. II, § 27 (provision adopted in 1874 and still in force);
CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. I, § 18 (now art. I, § 6); GA. CONST. of 1877, art. I, § 2-117; (now
at art. I, § 2-122); IND. CONST. art. I, § 37 (provision adopted in 1851 and still in force);
IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. I, § 23; LA. CONST. BOR art. V (1879, amended 1974); MICH.
CONST. of 1850, art. XVIII, § 11 (now at art. I, § 9); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 2 (provision
adopted in 1848 and still in force). The United States Constitution also contains such a
provision. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. See Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl.
Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 243 n.8, 635 P.2d 108, 116 n.8 (1981) (citing Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)).
44. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. I, § 15 (now at art. I, § 10); GA. CONST. of
1877, art. 1, § 2-121 (now at art. I, § 2-123); IND. CONST. art. I, § 22 (provision adopted in
1851 and still in force); IowA CONST. of 1846, art. I, § 19; N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. I, 17
(now at art. I, § 13); Wis. CONST. art. 1, § 16 (provision adopted in 1848 and still in
force).
45. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. II, § 11 (provision adopted in 1864 and still in force);
CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. I, § 13 (now at art. I, § 15); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 9 (provision
adopted in 1818 and still in force); GA. CONST. of 1877, art. I, § 2-105 (now at § 2-114);
IND. CONST. art. I, § 13 (provision adopted in 1851 and still in force); IowA CONST. of
1846, art. I, § 10; LA. CONST. BOR art. VIII (1879, amended 1974) (now at art. I, § 13);
N.J. CONST. of 1846, art. 1, T 9 (now at art. 1, § 10); W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 14 (provision
adopted in 1872 and still in force); WIs. CONST. art. I, § 7 (provision adopted in 1847 and
still in force).
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troublesome employees. 46 California and Georgia included provi-
sions disenfranchising duelers in their constitutions.4 California
also granted workers constitutional liens on the property of
other individuals 8 and prohibited disqualification from any bus-
iness, vocation, or profession on the basis of sex.49 In addition,
numerous state constitutions contain detailed provisions regulat-
ing corporations."
The many provisions regulating private action indicate that
late nineteenth-century constitution makers were well aware of
the broader nature of state constitutions and governments and,
thus, did not feel constrained to include any state action limita-
tions in their charters. The framers therefore enacted numerous
provisions that directly regulated private conduct and granted
private parties constitutional rights against each other.
IV. CASE LAW FROM OTHER STATES INTERPRETING PROVISIONS
SIMILAR TO THE WASHINGTON FREE SPEECH PROVISION
A brief review of some of the cases interpreting state free
speech provisions similar to the Washington provision reveals
that these provisions may protect individual freedom against
private abridgment.5 1 In Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge No.
665,52 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a private
union could not, even pursuant to a union rule, expel a member
for signing a petition urging the legislature to repeal a statute
strongly supported by the union. The court rested its decision
46. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 23 (provision adopted in 1889 and still in force). See J.
HICKS, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE NORTHWEST STATES 56 (1923) (reprinted in 1971).
47. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 2 (provision adopted in 1879 and still in force); GA.
CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 2-902 (repealed 1945).
48. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 15 (provision adopted in 1879 and still in force).
49. Id. § 18.
50. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. XII; CAL. CONST. art. XII; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. IV,
§ 2-502 (now at art. III, § 2-105); ILL. CONST. art. XI; IND. CONST. art. XI; IOWA CONST. of
1846 art. VIII; LA. CONST. arts. 234-248 (1879, amended 1974) (now at art. XII, § 12);
MICH. CONST. art. XV, §§ 1-12 (1850, repealed 1963); N.Y. CONST. of 1838, art. VIII (now
at art. X); PA. CONST. art. XVI (1874, amended 1967) (now at art. X); W. VA. CONST. art.
XI; WIS. CONST. art. XI.
51. This discussion includes only cases that interpret similarly worded constitu-
tional provisions. There are other cases interpreting constitutional provisions with differ-
ent wording not analyzed here. See, e.g., Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, 388 Mass. 83,
94, 445 N.E.2d 590, 595 (1983) (holding that individuals had a state constitutional right
to solicit signatures in a privately owned shopping center mall); State v. Felmet, 302 N.C.
173, 178, 273 S.E.2d 708, 711-12 (1981) (holding that there was no state constitutional
right to solicit signatures in the parking lot of a privately owned shopping center).
52. 270 Pa. 67, 113 A. 70 (1921).
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solely on the free speech and petition provision of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution,53 asserting that individuals, corporations,
and unincorporated associations could not infringe free speech
rights or other constitutional rights, any more than could the
state." '
In Zelenka v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 55 a
New Jersey court considered an Elks Club regulation that pro-
hibited Elks lodges and members from circulating any writing
regarding Elks' affairs without first submitting such writing to
the national Grand Exalted Ruler for his approval.5 6 The plain-
tiff was expelled from the Elks Club because he failed to obtain
prior approval for a newspaper advertisement soliciting Elk
members' support for a formal effort to open membership in the
53. Id. at 69, 113 A. at 71. The provision reads: "The free communication of
thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may
freely speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that lib-
erty. ... PA. CONST. art. I, § 7. The case was decided in 1921, prior to the enactment
of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1975) (originally enacted in
1935), or any other legislation that arguably might have conferred some form of govern-
mental authority on the union.
54. The rights above noted cannot lawfully be infringed, even momentarily, by
individuals, any more than by the state itself. . . and least of all can they be
breached by corporations and unincorporated associations, which function
solely by grace of the state, and the "supervision and control" of which are
specifically vested in courts of equity . . . . We have often said that the by-
laws, rules, and regulations of these artificial bodies will be enforced only when
they are reasonable . . . and they never can be adjudged reasonable when, as
here, they would compel the citizen to lose his property rights in accumulated
assets, or forego the exercise of other rights which are constitutionally
inviolable.
Spayd, 270 Pa. at 69-70, 113 A. at 72 (citations omitted). The court reasoned that:
[slince the fundamental law forbids the violation of such a prerogative by the
government itself, neither the courts nor any [union] tribunal may ignore the
inhibition. . . . [Y]et here, were appellants' contentions to be sustained, the
[union] tribunals, or courts, of their organization could ignore the state Consti-
tution, which guarantees the citizen's right of petition, and, by so functioning,
deprive plaintiff of his membership in defendant order.
Id. at 71, 113 A. at 72.
The court also quoted an earlier Pennsylvania case protecting a state constitutional right
against private abridgment, which stated:
This [right of acquiring property] is one of the rights guaranteed [a workman]
by our "Declaration of Rights"; it is a right of which the Legislature cannot
deprive him, one which the law of no trades union can take from him, and one
which it is the bounden duty of the courts to protect.
Id. at 72, 113 A. at 72 (quoting Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 91, 56 A. 327, 331
(1903)).
55. 129 N.J. Super. 379, 324 A.2d 35, cert. denied, 66 N.J. 317, 331 A.2d 17 (1974).
56. Id. at 381, 324 A.2d at 36.
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Order to nonwhites.57 The court ordered the wayward Elk rein-
stated to his lodge on the ground that the expulsion and the rule
on which it was based violated the public policy of free expres-
sion embodied in article I, paragraph 6 of the New Jersey Con-
stitution,58 and because the association could advance no suffi-
ciently compelling countervailing interest in restricting public
discussion of Elks' affairs. 9 The court did not expressly state
that the free speech provision applied directly to a voluntary
private organization, but this conclusion is implicit.
In the past few years, a number of state courts, interpreting
free speech provisions similar to Washington's, have addressed
the question whether their state constitutions protect the exer-
cise of free speech and petition rights in privately owned univer-
sities and shopping centers. Some courts have expressly rejected
a state action requirement for state free speech provisions, and
other courts have avoided expressly addressing the issue while
reaching a result that is consistent only with the elimination of
any state action requisite.
In State v. Schmid,60 for example, the New Jersey Supreme
Court concluded that a private university could not evict a per-
son for distributing political literature on its campus. Interpret-
ing a free speech provision that was derived from the ultimate
source of the Washington provision,6 the New Jersey high court
stated:
[TIhe rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the State
Constitution are protectable not only against governmental or
public bodies, but under some circumstances against private
persons as well. It has been noted that in our interpretation of
fundamental State constitutional rights, there are no con-
straints arising out of principles of federalism .... Hence,
federal requirements concerning "state action," founded pri-
marily in the language of the Fourteenth Amendment and in
principles of federal-state relations, do not have the same force
57. Id. at 386-87, 324 A.2d at 39.
58. The New Jersey free speech provision reads: "Every person may freely speak,
write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that
right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press."
N.J. CONST. art. I, 6. The original New Jersey provision was modeled after N.Y. CONST.
of 1821 art. VII, § 8 (now at art. I, 8). See N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. I, 6.
59. Zelenka, 129 N.J. Super. at 383-87, 324 A.2d at 37-39.
60. 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 100 (1982).
61. See supra note 58 (source of New Jersey provision) and infra note 90 (source of
Washington provision) and accompanying text.
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when applied to state-based constitutional rights.6 2
The court also pointed out that "one of the most important
functions performed by state constitutional bills of rights which
is not performed by the federal constitution is the protection of
citizens against private oppression as well as oppression by the
state."6 3 The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the
New Jersey Constitution provides individuals with the comple-
mentary freedoms of speech and assembly and protects the rea-
sonable exercise of those rights against infringement by private
entities that have "assumed a constitutional obligation not to
abridge the individual exercise of such freedoms because of the
public use of their property."" The court then applied a balanc-
ing test and decided that the speech interests of those distribut-
ing leaflets outweighed the privacy and property interests of the
private university. 5
In another case, Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center,sa
the California Supreme Court held that "sections 2 and 3 of arti-
cle I of the California Constitution protect speech and petition-
ing, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the
centers are privately owned."6 " Although the court did not
expressly state that the California Constitution had no state
action requirement, the Washington court has interpreted Rob-
ins as impliedly abandoning any state action requirement for the
California Constitution.6
In Equitable Assurance Society of the United States v.
Michigan Citizens Lobby Coalition for Affordable Heat, 9 a
62. Schmid, 84 N.J. at 559-60, 423 A.2d at 628 (citations omitted).
63. Id. at 559 n.9, 423 A.2d at 628 n.9 (quoting King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66
N.J. 161, 193, 330 A.2d 1, 18 (1974) (Pashman, J., dissenting)).
64. Schmid, 84 N.J. at 560, 423 A.2d at 628.
65. Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 241, 635 P.2d
108, 114-15 (1981) (Washington Supreme Court used the Schmid court's explicit rejec-
tion of a state action requirement as one of the precedential bases for the Washington
court's similar decision).
66. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
67. Id. at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860. The California free speech
provision reads in pertinent part: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his
or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may
not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2. To compare
with the original language adopted in 1879, see infra notes 80 and 88 and accompanying
text.
68. Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 241, 635 P.2d
108, 114-15 (1981).
69. No. 82-66134-CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. Mar. 14, 1983) (currently on appeal). Note,
however, that in People v. Hubbard, 115 Mich. App. 73, 81, 320 N.W.2d 294, 298 (1982),
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lower court in Michigan concluded that the Michigan free
speech and petition provisions 70 do not have a state action
requirement. The court held that solicitation of signatures for
initiative proposals is protected in some privately owned places
because of their public nature.
State courts in New York and Pennsylvania have also held
that their state constitutions protect the exercise of free speech
rights in shopping centers and private colleges against what fed-
eral law would define as purely private action, without expressly
addressing whether their state charters retain some vestigial
form of state action requirement. 71 These courts and those pre-
the Michigan Court of Appeals held, without analysis, that the Michigan Constitution
did not afford to individuals the right to refuse to leave the premises of a nuclear power
facility as an expression of their fear of and opposition to nuclear power.
70. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 5 provides: "Every person may freely speak, write, express
and publish his views on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such right; and
no law shall be enacted to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press."
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 3 provides: "The people have the right peaceably to assemble, to
consult for the common good, to instruct their representatives and to petition the gov-
ernment for redress of grievances."
71. See Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 118 Misc. 2d 841, 848-49, 462 N.Y.S.2d
344, 349 (Suffolk County Sup. Ct. 1983) (shopping mall) (relying on N.Y. CONST. art. I, §
8, which reads: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right .... "); Commonwealth v. Tate,
495 Pa. 158, 175, 432 A.2d 1382, 1391 (1981) (private college) (relying on PA. CONST. art.
I, § 7, which reads: "The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the
invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any
subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty .... ").
Because of the attachment many courts have to the "state action" doctrine, some
courts that wish to reach private action go to great lengths to find "state action" when
none exists, rather than explicitly rejecting the state action requirement. A good example
of this approach is Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 131 Cal. App. 3d 816,
182 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1192, (1983), in which the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals ordered the management of a private, walled residential community
with no commercial district to permit the distribution within its gates of a local free
newspaper. Although the court expressly refused to base its holding on the direct appli-
cability of the California free speech provision to private conduct, leaving that decision
to the state supreme court, id. at 838, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 825-26, it applied a balancing test
that found "state action" where the federal courts would have found none. The balanc-
ing test emphasized the town-like characteristics of the private community, while
expressly recognizing that it did not constitute a company town for purposes of the fed-
eral state action requirement. The court also considered the fact that the community's
management permitted another free newspaper to be distributed in the community.
Thus, the court held that when a private entity with some town-like characteristics dis-
criminates against some newspapers, "the balance tips to the side of the scale which
imports the presence of state action" for purposes of applying free speech protections.
Id. at 843, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 829. Because discrimination by the management of a private
community that does not satisfy the definition of a company town is, by definition, pri-
vate discrimination, see supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text, this case may prop-
erly be categorized as a case protecting state constitutional free speech rights against
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viously discussed have interpreted free speech provisions similar
to Washington's and have firmly established the principle that
state constitutions can directly restrict private activity to pro-
tect state free speech rights. These decisions support the Wash-
ington court's view that a state constitutional free speech guar-
antee may not be limited by any state action requirement.
V. THE TEXT OF THE WASHINGTON FREE SPEECH PROVISION
Any attempt to determine the meaning of a particular con-
stitutional provision must consider the text itself. The Washing-
ton Constitution, like the constitutions of many states, guaran-
tees that "je]very person may freely speak, write and publish on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.
72
The Washington provision grants an affirmative right to all
persons in plain, unambiguous terms, without any express state
action limitation.7 3 A fundamental rule of constitutional con-
struction provides that if a constitutional provision is plain and
unambiguous on its face, then the words will be given their ordi-
nary meaning and no interpretation is necessary or permissi-
ble.74 The clear wording of the Washington free speech provision
hinders a legal or linguistic argument that could justify implying
a state action requirement. The unambiguous language supports
the conclusion that the Washington free speech provision con-
purely private infringement. This illustrates how some courts will apply convoluted rea-
soning to avoid abandoning the state action requirement, but still reach private action.
But see Cologne v. Westfarm Assocs., 192 Conn. 48, 62, 469 A.2d 1201, 1208 (1984)
(adopts federal analysis of shopping center as private property and declines to read Con-
necticut Constitution not to require state action).
72. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 5. In contrast, the federal free speech guarantee states
that: "Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. No clearer statement of a state action
requirement could be imagined. Although the first amendment only purports to prohibit
congressional legislation, the federal courts have extended its reach to the states and all
the branches of the federal government. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 716 (1971) (first amendment applies to all branches of the federal government);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (first amendment applied to states via the
fourteenth amendment due process clause).
73. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5. The provision contains no reference to the "govern-
ment" or "laws" or any other language that would indicate a state action requirement.
74. Anderson v. Chapman, 86 Wash. 2d 189, 191, 543 P.2d 229, 230 (1975); Utter,
supra note 1, at 509. The ordinary meaning is the meaning that the words would have
had for the majority of voters at the time the constitution was adopted. See State ex rel.
O'Connell v. Slavin, 75 Wash. 2d 554, 557, 452 P.2d 943, 945 (1969); B.F. Sturtevant Co.
v. O'Brien, 186 Wis. 10, 19, 202 N.W. 324, 327 (1925). See also Utter, supra note 1, at
509-10.
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tains no state action requirement.75
VI. THE ORIGIN OF THE WASHINGTON FREE SPEECH PROVISION
The implication of the text, that no state action require-
ment was intended, is supported by the origin and development
of the Washington free speech provision. Members of the Pre-
amble and Bill of Rights Committee7" considered several differ-
ent proposals, borrowed from several other state constitutions,
and produced at least two formal drafts before choosing the pre-
sent wording of the Washington free speech provision.77 The
third and final version was reported to the convention and
adopted without debate or amendment.78
The first draft of the free speech provision by the Bill of
Rights Committee was leaked to the press shortly after the con-
vention opened. In a story dated July 13, 1889, the Tacoma
Daily Ledger reported that the Preamble and Bill of Rights
Committee had virtually decided on a preamble and six sections
of the bill of rights. Among those decided upon was the free
speech provision, which decreed: "That no law shall be passed
restraining the free expression of opinion or restricting the right
to speak, write or print freely on any subject.
79
The origins of the committee's first draft, with its explicit
state action requirement, are easy to determine. Although the
Ledger story indicated that the committee closely followed the
75. A number of other courts and commentators have reached the same conclusion
in analyzing similarly worded state free speech provisions. See, e.g., Note, Free Speech,
supra note 3, at 541-42; Note, Private Abridgment, supra note 3, at 178-82. See also
cases cited supra notes 52-71 and accompanying text. But see Cologne v. Westfarm
Assocs., 192 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984) (court adopted the federal analysis and
declined to interpret the Connecticut Constitution to not require state action).
76. The Committee included C. H. Warner from Whitman County, see THE JOURNAL
OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1889, at 488 (B. Rosenow ed.
1962) [hereinafter cited as JOURNAL]; Gwin Hicks from Pierce County, id. at 475; George
Comegys from Whitman County, id. at 469; Francis Henry from Thurston County, id. at
475; Frank M. Dallam from Lincoln County, id. at 470; J. C. Kellogg from Island County,
id. at 477; and Louis Sohns from Cowlitz County, id. at 485.
77. This information was gathered from JOURNAL, supra note 76, and from a survey
of newspapers reporting on the Washington Constitutional Convention of 1889. Papers
surveyed include: The Seattle Times, The Seattle Post-Intelligencer, The Tacoma Daily
Ledger, The Tacoma Morning Globe, The Morning Oregonian (Portland), The Yakima
Herald, The Anacortes Progress, The Chehalis Nugget, The Puget Sound Weekly Argus
(Port Townsend), The Spokane Falls Review (weekly and daily), The Walla Walla
Weekly Union, and The Washington Standard (Olympia).
78. JOURNAL, supra note 76, at 496-97.
79. Tacoma Daily Ledger, July 13, 1889, at 4, col. 3 (emphasis added).
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California Constitution"° in drafting the Declaration of Rights,
the first draft of the Washington free speech provision was more
similar to and, in fact, nearly identical to the pertinent portion
of the proposed model constitution written by W. Lair Hill, a
noted Northwest lawyer and constitutional scholar."' This provi-
sion, which was borrowed from article I, section 8 of the 1857
Oregon Constitution,"2  contained an express state action
requirement.83
80. Id. The California free speech provision reads:
Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all sub-
jects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed
to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal pros-
ecutions for libels, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it
shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was
published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquit-
ted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact. Indict-
ments found, or information laid, for publications in newspapers, shall be tried
in the county where such newspapers have their publication office, or in the
county where the party alleged to be libeled resided at the time of the alleged
publication, unless the place of trial shall be changed for good cause.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9 (1879, amended 1974) (original wording).
81. Hill's proposed constitution was printed in the Morning Oregonian on the open-
ing day of the convention, and a copy was placed on the desk of each delegate. The
delegates' respect for Mr. Hill's work is evidenced by the fact that fifty-one of its provi-
sions were adopted by the convention without change. State v. Rinaldo, 36 Wash. App.
86, 92, 673 P.2d 614, 617 (1983), aff'd, 102 Wash. 2d 749, 689 P.2d 392 (1984); Morning
Oregonian, July 4, 1889, at 9; JOURNAL, supra note 76, at v-vii; J. Fitts, The Washington
Constitutional Convention of 1889, at 21-22 (1951) (unpublished Master's thesis availa-
ble at the Washington State Library, Olympia); Beardsley, The Sources of the Washing-
ton Constitution as Found in the Constitutions of the Several States, in CONSTITUTION
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON iv (1939); see also M. AVERY, HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT OF
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 317 (1961). Hill's proposed free speech provision read as fol-
lows: "No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting
the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever, but every person shall
be responsible for the abuse of this right." W. Hill, Washington: A Constitution Adapted
to the Coming State 3 (1889) (available at the Washington State Law Library, Olympia)
(emphasis added) (Hill Proposed Const. art. I, § 5).
82. OR. CONsT art. I, § 8 reads: "No law shall be passed restraining the free expres-
sion of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject
whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right." The Hill free
speech provision has been identified, along with its antecedents, the Oregon and Indiana
provisions, as a "source" of the Washington provision, and one appellate judge has called
it the "first version" of the Washington free speech provision. State v. Rinaldo, 36 Wash.
App. 86, 92, 673 P.2d 614, 617 (1983), aff'd, 102 Wash. 2d 749, 689 P.2d 392 (1984). See
Beardsley, supra note 81, at vi. However, many people were opposed to using the Oregon
Constitution as a model. The Yakima Herald warned: "Oregon ... should not direct nor
should we be guided by her in the building of our constitution, for a state that has
builded [sic] as she has is not a suitable one to pattern after. Her laws are fossilized...
and . . . her law reports are less quoted as authority than those of most any other state."
Yakima Herald, July 18, 1889, at 2, col. 1.
83. Beardsley, supra note 81, at iv, vi.
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At or shortly after the July 13 meeting referred to in the
Ledger story, the Bill of Rights Committee substantially altered
the first draft of the free speech provision to eliminate the state
action language.84 The committee's second draft was published
in a Tacoma newspaper shortly before it was to be reported to
the convention. That draft read:
Every person may fully speak, write and publish on all sub-
jects, being responsible for an abuse of that right; in all trials
for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth when published with
good motives and for justifiable ends, shall be sufficient
defense. A jury shall have the right to determine the fact and
law under direction of the court."6
This language is similar to the free speech provision of the 1878
Washington Constitution, which had been adopted by the peo-
ple of Washington in an earlier unsuccessful bid for statehood.8
Both the second draft and the 1878 Washington free speech
provision were similar to the free speech provision of the 1879
California Bill of Rights, which apparently served as the model
84. The change may have been prompted by the free speech provision of an alterna-
tive Bill of Rights proposed to the convention by Delegate Weir of Port Townsend on
July 11, and subsequently referred to the Bill of Rights Committee. State v. Rinaldo, 36
Wash. App. 86, 92-93, 673 P.2d 614, 617-18 (1983), aff'd, 102 Wash. 2d 749, 689 P.2d 392
(1984); JOURNAL, supra note 76, at 50-53. The Weir free speech provision contained no
state action requirement: "The right of free speech written, printed or spoken, when not
infringing the rights of others, shall forever remain inviolate, and shall be secured to
every citizen." Rinaldo, 36 Wash. App. at 92, 673 P.2d at 617-18, aff'd, 102 Wash. 2d 749,
689 P.2d 392 (1984) (quoting Weir Proposed Const. art. 1, § 4); JOURNAL, supra note 76,
at 51, 496-97.
85. Tacoma Morning Globe, July 17, 1889, at 1, col 1.
86. The 1878 provision read:
Every person may freely speak, write and publish his opinions on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that liberty; and no law shall be passed to
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or the press. In all prosecutions for
libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury, and if it appears that the
matter charged as libelous be true, and was published with good motives and
for justifiable ends, the party accused shall be acquitted; and the jury shall
have the right to determine the law and the fact.
Proposed Wash. Const. art. V, § 7 in WASHINGTON'S FIRST CONSTITUTION, 1878, AND PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION 66 (E. Meany & J. Condon ed. 1919) [hereinafter cited as
WASHINGTON'S FIRST CONSTITUTION]. This provision may well have affected the commit-
tee's second draft since the 1878 constitution still had influential backing in 1889, and
one of the members of the 1889 Bill of Rights Committee had served on the Bill of
Rights Committee that drafted the 1878 provision. See id. at 10; W. Airey, A History of
the Constitution and Government of Washington Territory 439 (1945) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis available at the Washington State Library, Olympia); B. Parkany, "Reli-
gious Instruction" in the Washington Constitution 4 (1965) (unpublished Master's thesis
available at the Washington State Library, Olympia).
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for much of the committee's early work on the Washington Dec-
laration of Rights.8 7 The pertinent part of the California provi-
sion reads:
Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his senti-
ments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that
right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the lib-
erty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for
libels, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it
shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is
true, and was published with good motives, and for justifiable
ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the
right to determine the law and the fact ..8.8.
This language was adopted with only minor changes from the
free speech provision of the 1849 California Constitution, 9
which was in turn borrowed verbatim from the corresponding
provision of the 1846 New York Constitution." The 1846 New
87. See Tacoma Daily Ledger, July 17, 1889, at 4, col. 2; Tacoma Daily Ledger, July
13, 1889, at 4, col. 3. See also Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash.
2d 230, 240-41, 635 P.2d 108, 114 (1981) (stating that the Washington free speech provi-
sion was "modeled after" the California provision). The contemporary press also consid-
ered the California Constitution to be a good model for the Washington Constitution.
The Tacoma Daily Ledger stated:
California being a new western state with seaport cities, its interests are largely
identical with our own and its constitution thus makes provisions that are lia-
ble to be considered in the convention . . . .That the California constitution
will be frequently cited and quoted during the work of forming our own consti-
tution is certain.
Tacoma Daily Ledger, July 3, 1889, at 2, col. 2.
88. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9 (1879, amended 1974) (venue clause omitted). This provi-
sion was adopted with debate only on the libel clause. See E. WILLIS & P. STOCKTON,
DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF CALI-
FORNIA OF 1879, at 340-43 (1880).
89. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8 read:
Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments, on all sub-
jects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and no law shall be passed
to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal pros-
ecutions or indictments for libels, the truth may be given in evidence to the
jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelious [sic]
is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party
shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and
the fact.
The provision was adopted without debate. See J. BROWNE, THE FAR WESTERN FRONTIER:
REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA ON THE FORMATION OF THE
STATE CONSTITUTION IN SEPT. AND OCT. 1849, at 30-31 (1850).
90. J. BROWNE, supra note 89, at 31. It should be noted that this provision has mis-
takenly been said to have originated with the Iowa Constitution of 1846. See Comment,
Rediscovering the California Declaration of Rights, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 481, 495 (1974).
The author of the Comment misinterpreted the framers' declaration that "the first eight
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York provision originated in the almost identical free speech
provision of the 1821 New York Constitution." Thus, the second
draft was most likely the result of the committee's examination
of the Washington, California, and New York constitutional free
speech clauses.
Two separate and distinct guarantees were contained in the
California and New York provisions: first, an affirmative grant of
a free speech right, valid by its own terms against all the world;92
and second, a guarantee against laws that might abridge this
right. 3 The latter guarantee was eliminated from the second
sections of the report submitted ...were from the Constitution of New York; all the
others were from the Constitution of Iowa." J. BROWNE, supra note 89, at 31. He failed to
note that the free speech provision was numbered art. I, § 8 in the 1849 constitution, not
art. I, § 9 as it was numbered in the 1879 constitution and, therefore, originated with the
New York Constitution.
The New York provision reads:
Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all sub-
jects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed
to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal pros-
ecutions or indictments for libels, the truth may be given in evidence to the
jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is
true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party
shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and
the fact.
N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. I, § 8. See also W. BisHoP & W. ATTREE, REPORT OF THE
DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 7 (1846); W. CARROLL & J. COOK, JOURNAL OF THE [CONSTITU-
TIONAL] CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 285 (1846).
91. N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. VII, § 8. The 1821 provision was the same except
"criminal" had not yet been added. See W. CANTEREL & C. LEAKE, JOURNAL OF THE CON-
STITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 32 (1821); N. CARTER, W. STONE &
M. GOULD, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE [NEW YORK CONSTITU-
TIONAL] CONVENTION OF 1821, at 102-03 (1821). The only debates on this provision con-
cerned libel.
The sources of the 1821 New York free speech provision are unknown. The debates
of the 1821 convention do not disclose any source for the provision, and the clause
"[e]very citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects being
responsible for the abuse of that right" did not change from the first reported draft. Id.
at 32. The 1777 New York Constitution, which was the immediate predecessor of the
1821 constitution, had no free speech or press provision.
92. "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all sub-
jects, being responsible for the abuse of that right .... " CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9 (1879,
amended 1974). "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right . N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. I,
§8.
93. "[Ajnd no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of
the press. ... CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9 (1879, amended 1974). "[A]nd no law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press . N.Y. CONST. of
1846, art. I, § 8.
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draft, probably because it was redundant." In any event, the
adoption and subsequent deletion of the express state action
requirement in the Washington committee's first draft strongly
suggest an awareness and rejection of such a requirement for the
state free speech provision.
Other evidence also suggests that the provision was
intended to protect against private action. The committee's sec-
ond draft contained a constitutional defense against civil suits
for libel. 5 This apparently reflected a belief that false and mali-
cious civil libel was an abuse of the free speech right. Such an
exception permitting civil libel actions would be necessary only
if the initial clause of the provision was intended to protect
against private abridgment of free speech rights. 6
When the committee reported its third and final draft to
the convention on July 25, the provision was in its present form:
Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all sub-
jects, being responsible for the abuse of that right."
This draft was adopted by the convention without debate or
amendment." It is unknown why the language on libel was
removed, or why the word "fully" was changed to "freely," the
word used in the California and New York provisions. In its final
form, the Washington provision is quite similar to and probably
derived from the relevant portions of the California and New
York free speech provisions, neither of which explicitly requires
or has been interpreted to require state action. 9
94. Because the affirmative right protects against abridgment by all the world, it
includes protection against legislative abridgment as well. The Bill of Rights Committee
consciously attempted to make art. I as brief and concise as possible. Tacoma Daily
Ledger, July 11, 1889, at 4, col. 4.
95. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
96. The participants in the various constitutional conventions who produced the
predecessors of the Washington provision also demonstrated a great concern with how
the provision would affect liability, both criminal and civil, for libel. See, e.g., WASHINr-
TON'S FIRST CONSTITUTION, supra note 86, at 20; W. CANTEREL & C. LEAKE, supra note
91, at 167-69; E. WILLs & P. SrocKToN, supra note 88, at 340-43; see also Marlin Fire-
arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384, 391, 64 N.E. 163, 165 (1902) (declaring slander and
civil libel to be abuses of the state constitutional right of free speech and, therefore,
subject to subsequent prosecution or civil suit, but not subject to prior restraints).
97. JOURNAL, supra note 76, at 154.
98. Id.
99. See supra notes 66, 67, 71 and accompanying text. See also Robins v. Pruneyard
Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d 341, 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (1979),
aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 131 Cal. App. 3d
816, 843, 182 Cal. Rptr. 813, 829 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1192 (1983); Shad
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VII. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE WASHINGTON
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
The events surrounding the Constitutional Convention also
suggest that the Washington Constitution was intended to
restrict private activity. Many of the delegates to the convention
supported the developing populist movement of the 1880s and
1890s and distrusted both state government and large corpora-
tions.100 The delegates' attitudes were reflected in their cam-
paigns for seats at the convention.10 ' Delegates from all sections
of the territory and from both political parties campaigned on
the principle that the constitution should correct abuses by both
government and corporations and protect the rights of the com-
mon people.0 2 For example, the Republican candidates in King
County drew up a platform advocating restraint of corporate
activity.10 3 Similarly, one Olympia newspaper asserted that the
relationship between capital and labor and the conflict between
the interests of corporations and the rights of the people were
the most important questions to be decided at the constitutional
convention.' 4
Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 118 Misc. 2d 841, 848-49, 462 N.Y.S. 2d 344, 349 (Suffolk
County Sup. Ct. 1983); Gallaher v. American Legion, 154 Misc. 281, 284-85, 277 N.Y.S.
81, 84 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 242 A.D. 604, 271 N.Y.S. 1012 (1934).
100. See generally D. JOHANSEN & C. GATES, EMPIRE OF THE COLUMBIA: A HISTORY
OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 408-09, 417 (1957); Hicks, Six Constitutions of the Far
Northwest, 9 MIss. VALLEY HIST. A. PROC. 360-79 (1917-1918); Knapp, supra note 39, at
239-40, 251-52, 254, 263-64; Walla Walla Weekly Union, May 11, 1889, at 2, col. 3; W.
Airey, supra note 86, at 403-04, 450-51; J. Fitts, supra note 81, at 9; J. Smurr, A Critical
Study of the Montana Constitutional Convention of 1889, at 261-81 (1951) (unpublished
Master's thesis available at the Washington State Library, Olympia).
101. See, e.g., M. AVERY, supra note 81, at 200.
102. Walla Walla Weekly Union, May 11, 1889, at 2, col. 3-4; J. Fitts, supra note 81,
at 9.
103. Whereas, The corporations are creatures of the law, and the history of the
past has shown them to be aggressive and often acting in a manner regardless
of the rights and interests of the people; therefore be it Resolved, That our
delegates to the constitutional convention . . .use their influence for inserting
in the constitution of the state of Washington reasonable provisions for the
restraint and control of all corporations ... within the limits of the state ...
and to insist that the heritage of the people shall not be taken from them for
the advantage of corporations or private speculators.
See Morning Oregonian, May 8, 1889, at 2, col. 1; J. Fitts, supra note 81, at 9 n.1.
104. Washington Standard, April 19, 1889, at 2, col. 1. See J. Fitts, supra note 81, at
10 n.1. This is substantiated by Lebbeus Knapp, who stated: "The growth of power, and
the arrogant disregard of laws and the rights of people, by corporations made the ques-
tion of limiting corporate power one of the most vital and earnestly discussed questions
before the constitutional convention." Knapp, supra note 39, at 239 (emphasis added).
John Hicks, an early 20th-century scholar, agreed: "It is clear also that the delegates
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The desire to protect the rights of the common person
against the perceived rapacity of big business was reflected in
numerous proposed constitutional provisions. Delegate Turner
proposed a provision protecting the health of those employed in
mines and factories. 0 5 Delegate Dyer proposed that children
under fourteen be prohibited from working in mines, manufac-
turing, or other dangerous businesses. 106 Delegate Kinnear sub-
mitted a provision making it unlawful to import armed detec-
tives into Washington because they had previously been used to
crush labor strikes.1 0 7 A similar proposal was submitted by a
Tacoma union to prohibit private detective agencies from oper-
ating within the state.10 The Seattle Post-Intelligencer advo-
cated a provision prohibiting compulsory employment on elec-
tion days.'0  The newspaper also suggested a provision that
would require businesses "affected with a public interest" to
serve everyone on equal terms." 0 The Tacoma Daily Ledger
agreed:
It is proper that the constitution for this state should declare
that corporations and aggregations of capital are subject to leg-
islative control . . . A provision in the constitution that all
corporations and private enterprises which are affected with a
public interest are subject to legislative control ... would give
the public sufficient protection . .. ."
The Ledger also asserted that the state is "entitled to regu-
late and protect modes of transportation."1 2 This attitude was
shared by W. Lair Hill, whose model constitution included an
article devoted to corporations, which specified that corporations
are subject to regulation and cannot charge excessive or discrim-
desired more government, and not less. Wherever possible, corporations of all kinds...
must be controlled and regulated by the state . . . . The interests of the working clas-
ses-'their material, social, intellectual, and moral prosperity'-must be protected by the
State." Hicks, supra note 100, at 377.
105. Tacoma Daily Ledger, July 12, 1889, at 4, col. 4. See JOURNAL, supra note 76, at
58-59. This proposal was adopted as WASH. CONST. art. II, § 35. Id. at 552.
106. See JOURNAL, supra note 76, at 77.
107. Tacoma Daily Ledger, July 16, 1889, at 4, col. 1. See JOURNAL, supra note 76, at
96; Knapp, supra note 39, at 267.
108. Tacoma Daily Ledger, July 18, 1889, at 4, col. 1. See also JOURNAL, supra note
76, at 109. These proposals were adopted, in part, in art. 1, § 24. Id. at 512-13.
109. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 5, 1889, at 3, col. 1.
110. Id.
111. Tacoma Daily Ledger, July 27, 1889, at 2, col. 2-3.
112. Tacoma Daily Ledger, July 6, 1889, at 2, col. 1.
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inatory rates. 13
The Washington Constitutional Convention adopted a num-
ber of constitutional provisions granting rights against private
individuals and corporations. For instance, the Washington Con-
stitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to compel tes-
timony by private individuals in criminal trials114 and other pro-
ceedings 1 5 and prohibits imprisonment for private debts.
11 6 It
also grants individuals and corporations the right to take private
land by eminent domain for certain private purposes and guar-
antees the owners of condemned land a right to just compensa-
tion from the private taker. 7
Article XII of the Washington Constitution contains exten-
sive provisions regulating the relations between private corpora-
tions and their shareholders and customers and between corpo-
rations and the public in general.1 8 Among these provisions is
the express guarantee protecting individuals against discrimina-
tion in charges or facilities by any transportation company.
1 1 9
The historical background of the convention, as reflected in
statements by both the campaigning delegates and the press,
and in numerous proposed and adopted constitutional provi-
sions, demonstrates that the framers intended to regulate pri-
vate action that might infringe on constitutionally protected
rights.
113. All railway companies are common carriers, and as such are and shall
always be subject to the control and regulation of law. They shall not charge
extortionate or excessive rates for transportation, nor unjustly discriminate in
their charges or the rendering of services against or among persons or places.
Laws shall be enacted prohibiting under adequate penalties, violations of this
provision.
W. Hill, supra note 81, at 44 (Hill Proposed Const. art. X, § 7).
114. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22.
115. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 30.
116. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17.
117. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16.
118. See JOURNAL, supra note 76, at 733-71.
119. WASH. CONST. art. XII, § 15. Also, corporations are granted the right to sue and
be sued, WASH. CONST. art. XII, § 5, and stockholders are made personally liable for
certain corporate debts. WASH. CONST. art. XII, §§ 4, 11. Corporations are prohibited
from fixing prices, limiting production, or otherwise combining for monopoly purposes,
and railroad corporations are specifically prohibited from consolidating their stock, prop-
erty, or franchises with those of competing railroads. WASH. CONST. art. XII, §§ 16, 22.
Constitutional provisions also protect shareholder rights in the issuance of stock. WASH.
CONST. art. XII, § 6. The right of eminent domain against private property is extended to
private telegraph and telephone companies, and such companies are granted rights of
way over private railroad land. WASH. CONST. art. XII, § 19.
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VIII. THE CURRENT STATE OF WASHINGTON LAW
Although the text and historical evidence indicate that the
Washington free speech provision protects against private
abridgment of free speech rights, the case law on this point is
still largely undeveloped. Only one Washington Supreme Court
case is directly on point, ' ° and that case reveals a badly frag-
mented court.
In Alderwood Associates v. Washington Environmental
Council,"' a four-judge plurality'22 construed the Washington
free speech and initiative guarantees' 3 as containing no state
action limitation. The plurality held that the owners of privately
owned shopping centers must permit reasonably exercised
speech and petition activity on their property whenever a "bal-
ancing" of the competing interests indicates that the speech
interests outweigh the competing interests of the property
owner."" Although the plurality used the term "balance," the
analysis was a process of accommodation between apparently
competing constitutional rights.
The court relied on a number of factors to conclude that the
state free speech and initiative guarantees are not limited by any
state action requirement. First, the plurality opinion noted that
"Const. art. I, § 5, is not by its express terms limited to govern-
mental actions. In this regard, it is like amendment 7 [the initia-
tive provision] of the Washington Constitution."' 25 Second, the
plurality observed that two other states with very similar speech
guarantees had effectively abolished the state action require-
ment for speech protection under their constitutions.' 26 Third,
the plurality observed that the federal state action requirement
resulted from factors inherent in the federal system that restrain
the federal courts but do not limit the state courts.1 7 For
instance, the United States Supreme Court must establish rules
that could be effectively enforced in all parts of the country.
120. Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d
108 (1981).
121. 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981).
122. The plurality opinion was written by the author of this Article.
123. WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 4, 5; art. II, § 1 (amended 1981); see Note, Alderwood
Associates v. Washington Environmental Council: State Action and the Washington
State Constitution, 5 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 331, 332-34 (1982).
124. Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 244-46, 635 P.2d at 116-17.
125. Id. at 240, 635 P.2d at 114.
126. Id. at 240-41, 635 P.2d at 114-15.
127. Id. at 241-42, 635 P.2d at 115.
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Consequently, that Court can only provide the "lowest common
denominator" of individual freedom. 28 Similarly, the plurality
noted that the United States Supreme Court must leave the
states free to experiment. 1 9 Finally, the plurality's approach
emphasized the special preference given to speech rights in our
state's jurisprudence 3 and the growing importance of shopping
centers as public forums in Washington.'
The plurality opinion recognized, however, that no constitu-
tional provision could strictly apply to all public and private
conduct without becoming impracticable or violating competing
rights, such as the rights of private property owners.132 To avoid
these problems, the plurality adopted a method of accommodat-
ing the rights and interests of those who wish to restrain speech
with the rights and interests of those who wish to engage in
speech and petition activity.1
3
This approach is not only consistent with the absence of any
state action requirement in the text and history of Washington's
free speech guarantee, but it also creates a simple, flexible, and
workable framework for accommodating and protecting compet-
ing interests on a case-by-case basis. Because there is no distinc-
tion under the Washington free speech provision between gov-
ernmental and private action or between different types of
speech, all conflicts between speech and competing rights can be
resolved by accommodation of competing rights.
The federal Constitution, in contrast, divides infringement
of speech rights into private infringements, which are not pro-
tected, and governmental infringements, which are sometimes
protected.13 1 If the speech falls into a protected category of
expression, federal courts classify the exercise of such speech
128. Id. at 237, 242, 635 P.2d at 112, 115. This allows states that desire to give more
protection to civil liberties that opportunity, but does not require a standard so high as
to cause political discord among the states.
129. Id. at 242, 635 P.2d at 115.
130. Id. at 244, 635 P.2d at 116.
131. Id. at 246, 635 P.2d at 117.
132. Id. at 243, 635 P.2d at 116.
133. Id. at 243-44, 635 P.2d at 116. The court outlined the factors to be balanced in
the shopping center context: the nature and use of the private property, and particularly
the extent to which it is open to the public; the nature of the speech activity, including
whether the speech also involves the initiative process; the potential for reasonable time,
place, and manner regulations; and the extent to which the speech, as regulated, impairs
the value or use of the property.
134. See supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text. See also L. TRIBE, supra note
10, at 694-99, 1165-67, 1173.
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activity as a "fundamental right" and apply "strict scrutiny" to
determine if the governmental infringement is valid. 3 " Accom-
modation eliminates the need for any such complex distinctions
and for a threshold determination of the presence or absence of
state action because the court is able to decide every free speech
case whether or not state action is present.
Although no higher level of scrutiny is required for govern-
mental action than for private action under the plurality's
approach, governmental interests will necessarily be given some-
what lesser value in the accommodation process than private
interests. Because the state government's powers are expressly
limited by the state constitution, including those rights enumer-
ated in the Declaration of Rights, the governmental interest
would not outweigh the rights of private individuals. '36 Thus,
the question will not be "What is the type of government inter-
est involved?" but rather "Has the individual's right been vio-
lated?" This approach must take into consideration that the
right may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner reg-
ulations 3 ' and that the speaker or writer is responsible for the
"abuse of that right." 3 '
In addition, even if examination could reveal that govern-
135. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976) (discharge of public employee
based on partisan political affiliation); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-65 (1976)
(requirement of public disclosure of political contributors); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449, 460-61 (1958) (disclosure of membership lists of association to the state).
136. See WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 29, which declares that "[tihe provisions of this
Constitution are mandatory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise."
This principle has been affirmed by case law. See, e.g., State ex rel. Anderson v. Chap-
man, 86 Wash. 2d 189, 192, 543 P.2d 229, 230-31 (1975); State ex rel. Lemon v. Langlie,
45 Wash. 2d 82, 97, 273 P.2d 464, 473 (1954). Also, it is well established that the state
constitution is a limitation upon governmental powers, and laws in violation of the con-
stitution are prohibited. See, e.g., Fain v. Chapman, 89 Wash. 2d 48, 53, 569 P.2d 1135,
1139 (1977); Moses Lake School Dist. No. 161 v. Big Bend Community College, 81 Wash.
2d 551, 555, 503 P.2d 86, 89 (1973); State ex rel. Morgan v. Kinnear, 80 Wash. 2d 400,
402, 494 P.2d 1362, 1363 (1972). See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
It is well established that the government has no power to restrict expression
because of the message, ideas, subject matter, or content. See, e.g., Police Dept. v. Mos-
ley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); State v. Hamilton, 24 Wash. App. 927, 934, 604 P.2d 1008,
1013 (1979). Also, any government restraint on speech bears a heavy presumption
against its constitutionality. State v. Lotze, 92 Wash. 2d 52, 57, 593 P.2d 811, 813, appeal
dismissed, 444 U.S. 921 (1979); City of Seattle v. Bittner, 81 Wash. 2d 747, 750-51, 505
P.2d 126, 128 (1973).
137. See Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 245, 635 P.2d at 116; State v. Lotze, 92
Wash. 2d 52, 58, 593 P.2d 811, 814, appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 921 (1979); King County
ex rel. Sowers v. Chisman, 33 Wash. App. 809, 814-15, 658 P.2d 1256, 1259 (1983).
138. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5.
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mental interests prevail over free speech rights because the court
finds that the individual's right has not been violated, the analy-
sis does not end with a determination that the state constitution
offers no protection to the expressive activity. The court must
then proceed to determine whether any federal constitutional
rights have been violated. Once the first amendment is invoked
against a governmental official or entity, strict scrutiny will
weed out all but the most compelling justifications for govern-
mental restraints on speech activity.139 Thus, under the plural-
ity's approach, the Washington Constitution provides far more
protection than does the federal Constitution against suppres-
sion of speech by private entities and individuals, but the fed-
eral Constitution may in some rare instances provide greater
protection against infringement of fundamental speech rights by
laws and governmental officials.140
Professor Sanford Levinson of the University of Texas Law
School has expressed concern that a balancing approach to state
constitutional free speech provisions may put courts in the posi-
tion of examining the content of speech, the identity of the
speakers, and the effects of the speech.141 He suggests that the
theory of free speech a court embraces and the normative values
protected by the particular theory will shape the court's decision
regarding what type of speech receives protection. 4" The conse-
quence could then be state use of its power to protect some
139. See, e.g., New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (quashed
the federal government's attempt to prevent publication of information allegedly danger-
ous to national security); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1967)
(struck a regulation that required dismissal of teachers associated with the Communist
Party). See also supra note 135 and accompanying text.
140. State constitutions may provide more protection for civil liberties than is pro-
vided under the federal Constitution, but if they provide less, the state courts must also
rely on the federal Constitution and provide the amount of protection required under
that document. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Alder-
wood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 237, 635 P.2d at 112; Comment, Project Report: Toward an
Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271, 284 (1973); Note,
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center: Federalism and State Protection of Free
Speech, 10 GOLDEN GATE 805, 817 (1980).
141. Address by Professor Sanford Levinson, Freedom of Speech and the Right of
Access to Private Property Under State Constitutional Law, at the National Conference
on Developments in State Constitutional Law, Williamsburg, Va. (Mar. 10, 1984).
142. Levinson suggested, for example, that a "marketplace of ideas" approach would
protect all information equally. A "freedom of expression" approach would protect
behavior such as draft card burning. And a third approach, emphasizing safeguarding a
republican form of government, offers special protection to political speech. Id.
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groups and not others. 43 In view of Professor Levinson's com-
ments, it is important to remember that the Alderwood Associ-
ates decision is a benchmark. How courts will resolve the diffi-
cult issues he raises remains to be seen.
Another criticism of the plurality's "balancing" test is that,
by considering the extent to which the property is open to the
public and the extent to which it becomes the functional
equivalent of a downtown area or other public forum,'4 4 the
court essentially is introducing a state action requirement. 45
This criticism misconstrues both the federal "state action" doc-
trine and the Alderwood Associates plurality's "balancing"
approach.'46 Under the federal public function doctrine, the
court will find "state action" only when the private person or
entity is engaged in an activity that is a traditional and exclu-
sive function of government. 47 Under that doctrine, the fact
that property is merely open to the public and has become a
public place is not sufficient. 148
In contrast, the plurality's analysis does not require any
such government-like activity. Rather, the accommodation test
simply allows the court to consider as one factor the extent to
which private property resembles a public place.4 9 Not only
may speech rights be protected on property that is used for
activities that have never been traditional or exclusive functions
of government, but the property need not even be particularly
public for speech to be protected thereon if other factors mili-
tate in favor of protection.1 50 Similarly, speech activity on prop-
erty that is dedicated to almost unrestricted public use or is uti-
lized to perform a traditional and exclusive governmental
function might not be protected by the Washington Constitution
143. Id.
144. Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 244, 635 P.2d at 116.
145. See Note, Free Speech, Initiative and Property Rights in Conflict-Four
Alternatives to the State Action Requirement in Washington, 58 WASH. L. REV. 587,
599-604 (1983).
146. The Washington court's use of the phrase "traditional public function" refers
to the shopping center's function as a public forum and is not a reference to any govern-
ment function. See Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 246, 635 P.2d at 117 ("The shop-
ping center now performs a traditional public function by providing the functional
equivalent of a town center or community business block.").
147. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978) (emphasis added).
148. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1977). See supra notes 11-21 and
accompanying text.
149. Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 244, 246, 635 P.2d at 116-17.
150. Id. at 244-45, 635 P.2d at 116-17.
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if, for example, the owner had no effective means of enforcing
reasonable time, place, and manner regulations, or if the speech
activity was so unreasonable that it would seriously impair the
value of the property.' Thus, the Alderwood Associates accom-
modation approach does not incorporate any implicit state
action requirement, in spite of a superficial linguistic resem-
blance to one element of a narrowly construed federal doctrine.
The accommodation approach described above was only
adopted by four justices, with Justice Dolliver concurring in the
plurality's result.152 Justice Dolliver relied on the state's police
powers, rather than on the free speech provision, to protect the
right to gather initiative signatures at privately owned shopping
centers. Justice Dolliver wrote:
The police power of the State is an attribute of its sovereignty,
an essential element of the power to govern. The power exists
without declaration, and the only limitation upon it is that it
must reasonably tend to promote some interest of the State,
and not violate any constitutional mandate. 153
The state historically has used the police power to regulate
the private sector to promote the public health, safety, and wel-
fare.154 Because the state has a strong welfare interest in pro-
tecting the fundamental rights of individuals, the police power
may be used to require certain private actors to honor funda-
mental individual rights. In the case of initiative rights, Justice
Dolliver found no need for implementing legislation because the
initiative provision of the Washington Constitution is self-exe-
cuting.'55 The same reasoning would support making the free
speech provision directly applicable to private action without
the need for implementing legislation.'56
151. Id. at 245, 635 P.2d at 116-17.
152. Id. at 247, 635 P.2d at 118. Four Justices dissented from the "abrogation" of
the state action requirement. Justice Stafford wrote the dissent, joined by Chief Justice
Brachtenbach and Justices Hicks and Dimmick. Id. at 253, 635 P.2d at 121.
153. Id. at 252, 635 P.2d at 120 (Dolliver, J., concurring).
154. See Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Department of Ecology, 88 Wash. 2d 726,
729-30, 565 P.2d 1162, 1164 (1977); State v. Dexter, 32 Wash. 2d 551, 554, 202 P.2d 906,
907 (1941). See also generally E. FREUND, supra note 38; A. RUSSELL, supra note 38; 1 C.
TIEDEMAN, supra note 38.
155. Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 251-53, 635 P.2d at 120 (Dolliver, J., concur-
ring). See State ex rel. Case v. Superior Court, 81 Wash. 623, 632, 143 P. 461, 463-64
(1914). See also WASH. CONST. art. II, § I(a) (amended 1981).
156. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 29 states: "The provisions of this Constitution are
mandatory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise." Because the free
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Thus, Justice Dolliver agreed with the plurality's emphasis
on the importance of protecting freedom of speech, even against
private individuals and entities, although he used a different
method to reach the same result. While Justice Dolliver chose to
rely on the police power, the plurality opted to address the issue
directly and expressly refused to adopt any state action require-
ment for the Washington free speech provision. Rather, it chose
to protect the values promoted by free speech by an accommo-
dation test to determine whether the speech activity merited
constitutional protection. Alderwood Associates is the Washing-
ton Supreme Court's first decision accommodating competing
rights protected by the Washington Constitution. As the court is
presented with new situations, new perspectives will arise and
will naturally inform the court's approach to the process.
IX. VALUES OF FREE SPEECH PROMOTED UNDER THE
WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION
Freedom of speech is a preferred right under the Washing-
ton Constitution 5 7 because of its importance as a value in itself
and as a means to further other normative values. Some values
served by free speech include attainment of individual self-reali-
zation and fulfillment,'58 advancement of knowledge and discov-
ery of truth,' 59 the practice of democratic self-government,' °
speech provision does not include wording that implies implementing legislation is
needed, the provision must be self-executing. See supra note 136.
157. State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 375, 679 P.2d 353, 360 (1984); Alderwood
Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 244, 635 P.2d at 116; Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping
Center, 3 Wash. App. 833, 846, 478 P.2d 792, 799 (1972). See also Tacoma Daily Ledger,
May 9, 1889, at 3, col. 1, in which a letter to the editor of the Tacoma Daily Ledger
asserted that "[a]gitation is the first step in the ladder of progress. All movements have
succeeded by bringing [their arguments] before the people. Silence has always been the
cry of all moral cowards."
158. The self-realization and fulfillment concept is derived from core democratic
values: the right of individuals to control their own destinies and develop their faculties.
Free speech helps individuals control their own destinies by allowing them to make intel-
ligent choices in life's decisions. Free speech also fosters the development of human fac-
ulties directly because speaking, writing, creating, and learning involve the use and
development of an individual's unique talents.
Under the self-realization ideal, one type of expression cannot be given more consti-
tutional protection than others because self-realization precludes any external determi-
nation that some expression fosters self-realization more than, does other expression.
However, in extreme cases, full constitutional protection may be forced to give way to
prevent infringement on others' rights to self-realization. See generally J. MILL, REPRE-
SENTATIVE GOVERNMENT ch. 3 (1861); Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 591 (1982).
159. Free trade in the "marketplace of ideas" is the best test of truth because com-
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and the retention of a stable community in a heterogeneous and
changing society."'
All four of these values are reflected in or protected by the
Washington Supreme ,Court's decision in Alderwood Associates.
The court recognized the value of participation in democratic
self-government by noting that "[ilt is undisputed that gather-
ing initiative signatures . . . is a constitutionally guaranteed
practice. It is at the core of both the first amendment and Const.
art. I, § 5. ''162 The court also stated that "signature gathering in
a shopping mall furthers the exchange of ideas[,]" 13 thus recog-
nizing the value of free speech in the advancement of knowledge
and the discovery of truth.
The other values were also implicitly protected by the
Alderwood Associates court. With the right to free speech guar-
anteed in private shopping centers and other places similar to
petition will eventually result in acceptance of the most truthful ideas and rejection of
false ideas. Because human beings can never be certain of what truth is, accepted doc-
trines must be continually barraged by challenging ideas. These challenges are necessary
to prevent non-truth from becoming entrenched as truth and accepted as unquestioned
dogma. Because truth cannot be determined, censorship may result in the exclusion of
truth. Therefore, all ideas, even those believed by most to be false or offensive, must be
constitutionally protected. See generally J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 1-48 (Oxford ed. 1946).
160. Free speech is necessary for perpetuation of a democratic system. Speech is
vital to both individual participation in the political process and the checking of official
abuses. Citizens must be informed in order to formulate intelligent opinions on current
issues, to vote, and to advocate change in government policies. Citizens must also be
informed of abuses by government officials so that they can show their disapproval by
removing them from office. To ensure that the electorate will be informed, individuals
must be able to speak freely about government policies, official abuses, and other current
issues. Although "political" speech most directly fosters this value, education in all sub-
jects aids the creation of an informed electorate and, therefore, all forms of speech ought
to be given constitutional protection. See generally Blasi, The Checking Value in First
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 523; Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245.
161. Free speech also serves to stabilize a heterogeneous and changing society. Free
speech allows for diversity of opinions. Individuals and groups may teach and learn these
diverse ideas, and free speech enables them to reevaluate and change their attitudes
when they desire. Free speech also prevents the majority from imposing its ideas on the
minority. It allows the minority to disagree openly with the majority's political, social,
economic, or religious ideas. They may criticize the government and attempt to change
governmental policies via peaceful advocacy and will be less likely to use more disruptive
means to achieve change. Thus, civil unrest, one symptom of an oppressive society, may
be prevented by freedom of speech. See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-
87, 105-25 (1980); T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1966); J. MILL, supra note 159; Meiklejohn, supra note 160.
162. Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 239, 635 P.2d at 114. See also id. at 244-45,
635 P.2d at 116.
163. Id. at 246, 635 P.2d at 117.
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traditional public forums, individuals and groups will be able to
speak and hear different opinions on current issues and other
subjects. This promotes individual self-realization and fulfill--
ment. The Alderwood Associates decision also serves to prevent
those in control of certain public forums from muffling those
with minority opinions, thereby encouraging diversity and toler-
ance and lessening the likelihood that those with minority view-
points will feel the need to turn to more disruptive methods to
make themselves heard.'
X. APPLICATION OF THE Alderwood Associates DOCTRINE TO
OTHER CONTEXTS
In Alderwood Associates, the accommodation of conflicting
constitutional rights established that the exercise of speech
rights in shopping centers is protected because the right to
engage in free speech activity is more important than the com-
peting interests of shopping center owners. The same balancing
test could establish that free speech rights deserve protection in
other private contexts as well, though additional factors may
also have to be considered.
It may be argued, for example, that speech rights should
prevail over the interests of the owners of private schools, col-
leges, and universities' 5 in restricting speech activity on cam-
puses. In addition to the factors discussed in Alderwood Associ-
ates, an important factor that courts may consider when speech
activity has been suppressed by a private college is that colleges
have traditionally been a central forum in the marketplace of
ideas and serve as a source of intellectual stimulation for the
outside community as well as for students and faculty.' 66 In
164. Id. at 239-40, 244-46, 635 P.2d at 113-14, 116-17.
165. See State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 567-69, 423 A.2d 615, 632-33 (1980) (holding
that a private university violated a similar state free speech provision by evicting and
procuring the arrest of an individual for distributing literature on the university cam-
pus). See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text. See also Commonwealth v. Tate,
495 Pa. 158, 175, 432 A.2d 1382, 1391 (1981) (reversing the trespassing convictions of
individuals arrested for attempting to distribute literature protesting a speaker at a pub-
lic meeting held on a private university's campus). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
relied on the Pennsylvania free speech provision, which is similar to the Washington
provision. See supra note 71. See generally Cohen, The Private-Public Legal Aspects of
Institutions of Higher Education, 45 DEN. L.J. 643 (1968); Schubert, State Action and
the Private University, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 323 (1970).
166. See State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 563-64, 423 A.2d 615, 630-31 (1980); Com-
monwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 170-71, 432 A.2d 1382, 1387 (1981). See also Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969); Keyishian v.
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reaching their decisions, courts will need to accommodate the
rights of students, faculty, and others to receive as well as to
disseminate information. 167 In addition to the college's property
rights, courts will examine the extent to which the speech activ-
ity interferes with the operation or goals of the school.16
A second area likely to be litigated concerns speech in pri-
vate residential communities. The exercise of free speech rights
may be especially vulnerable in privately owned or managed
communities such as apartment and condominium complexes,6 9
planned communities, 170 mobile home parks, 171 nursing homes,'172
and agricultural labor camps.173 In these communities, all the
common areas, including halls, stairs, elevators, paths, streets,
parking lots, and other community facilities, are usually owned
by a private corporation or individual. If left unregulated, the
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250
(1957); Stastney v. Board of Trustees, 32 Wash. App. 239, 249, 647 P.2d 496, 504 (1982).
See generally Fuchs, Academic Freedom-Its Basic Philosophy, Function, and History,
28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 431 (1963). See also supra notes 158-61.
167. See, e.g., Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 244-46, 635 P.2d at 116-17. See
State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 562, 423 A.2d 615, 629-30 (1980); Commonwealth v. Tate,
495 Pa. 158, 170-71, 432 A.2d 1382, 1387-88 (1981). See also Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976); Fritz v. Gorton, 83
Wash. 2d 275, 296-98, 517 P.2d 911, 924-25 (1974). See generally Comment, Freedom to
Hear: A Political Justification of the First Amendment, 46 WASH. L. REv. 311 (1971).
168. See, e.g., Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 245, 635 P.2d at 116-17. See State
v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 563-64, 423 A.2d 615, 630-31 (1980); Commonwealth v. Tate, 495
Pa. 158, 171-73, 432 A.2d 1382, 1390 (1981). For instance, a private fundamentalist reli-
gious college may have a greater interest in regulating proselytizing by competing reli-
gions on its campus than would a state university.
169. See Note, Freedom of Religion as Basis for Access to Private Apartment
Buildings, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1948); Note, Private Abridgment, supra note 3,
at 169-71.
170. See Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 131 Cal. App. 3d 816, 844,
182 Cal. Rptr. 813, 829 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1192 (1983). See also supra
note 71; State v. Kolcz, 114 N.J. Super. 408, 276 A.2d 595 (1971).
171. See Note, Private Abridgment, supra note 3, at 169-71.
172. See Comment, Access to Private Fora and State Constitutions: A Proposed
Speech and Property Analysis, 46 ALB. L. REV. 1501, 1527 (1982); Comment, Nursing
Home Access: Making the Patient Bill of Rights Work, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 473, 493-94
(1977); Note, Private Abridgment, supra note 3, at 169-71 (1980).
173. See Freedman v. New Jersey State Police, 135 N.J. Super. 297, 302-03, 343
A.2d 148, 151 (1975) (holding that a reporter and photographer could not be barred from
entering a privately owned labor camp); Sherman and Levy, Free Access to Migrant
Labor Camps, 57 A.B.A. J. 434, 435-46 (1971); Note, Access to Migrant Labor Camps:
Marsh v. Alabama Revisited, 55 CH-.[-]KENT L. REV. 285, 291-92 (1979); Note, First
Amendment and the Problem of Access to Migrant Labor Camps After Lloyd Corpora-
tion v. Tanner, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 560, 561-63 (1976); Note, Private Abridgment, supra
note 3, at 169-71.
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owner could restrict the rights of the residents to assemble,
speak, demonstrate, or advocate within their own community.
Also, canvassers disseminating information or seeking signatures
for political petitions, political and labor organizers, and even
newspapers could be excluded from the community.174
When speech is curtailed by the owner or manager of a pri-
vate residential community, courts may be asked to consider the
speaker's right to speak and the right of the residents to receive
information. 175 Other relevant factors include the residents' right
to privacy, 176 the extent to which the speech interferes with resi-
dents' use of their property,77 and the extent to which residents'
property values are diminished.178
The speech rights of persons who belong to unions and
other private associations may also, under certain circumstances,
be found to prevail over the interests of such associations in reg-
ulating the speech of members.17 9 When a private association
174. See supra notes 169-73.
175. See, e.g., Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 244-46, 635 P.2d at 116-17. See
Freedman v. New Jersey State Police, 135 N.J. Super. 297, 302, 343 A.2d 148, 151 (1975);
State v. Kolcz, 114 N.J. Super. 408, 412-16, 276 A.2d 595, 597-99 (1971). See also Vir-
ginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57
(1976); Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 296-98, 517 P.2d 911, 924-25 (1974). See also
supra notes 158-61. See generally Comment, supra note 167.
176. See, e.g., Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 244, 635 P.2d at 116. See Robins v.
Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 908-10, 592 P.2d 341, 346-47, 153 Cal. Rptr.
854, 859-60 (1979); State v. Kolcz, 114 N.J. Super. 408, 412-16, 276 A.2d 595, 597-99
(1971).
177. See, e.g., Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 244-45, 635 P.2d at 116-17. See
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-85 (1980); Robins v. Pruneyard
Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 904-08, 592 P.2d 341, 343-45, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 856-59
(1979).
178. See, e.g., Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 244-45, 635 P.2d at 116-17.
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-85 (1980); Robins v. Pruneyard
Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 904-08, 592 P.2d 341, 343-45, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 856-59
(1979).
179. See Zelenka v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 129 N.J. Super. 379,
386-87, 324 A.2d 35, 39, cert. denied, 66 N.J. 317, 331 A.2d 17 (1974) (private associa-
tion's requirement that members obtain permission from the association's leader to write
about the association was held unconstitutional); Gallaher v. American Legion, 154 Misc.
281, 284-85, 277 N.Y.S. 81, 84 (New York County Sup. Ct. 1934) (private association's
regulation prohibiting members from criticizing the association found unconstitutional
by a New York court interpreting a similar free speech provision); Dudek v. Pittsburgh
City Firefighters, 425 Pa. 233, 242, 228 A.2d 752, 756 (1967) (holding unconstitutional a
union's order requiring members to picket and the levy of fines on those who refused);
Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge No. 665, 270 Pa. 67, 69-70, 113 A. 70, 71-72 (1921) (court
prohibited a private association from invading members' right to speak about and criti-
cize the association under a free speech provision similar to Washington's). See supra
notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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attempts to suppress the speech of its members, courts are likely
to examine such factors as the right of the speaker to speak,'
the rights of other association members or the public to receive
information,8 ' whether members' associational rights are vio-
lated,1 82 whether the speaker acts as a representative of the asso-
ciation or as an individual,8 3 the extent to which the speech is
inconsistent with the purpose and function of the association,'
8 4
and the extent to which secrecy or public solidarity, if legiti-
mately important to the association, may be violated.' 85
Another potential area of conflict concerns private employ-
ers. Employers can exert great control over the private as well as
the working lives of their employees and can significantly
impede their freedom of expression.8 6 Because of the economic
180. See, e.g., Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 244-46, 635 P.2d at 116-17. See
Zelenka v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 129 N.J. Super. 379, 385, 324 A.2d 35,
37-38, cert. denied, 66 N.J. 317, 331 A.2d 17 (1974); Gallaher v. American Legion, 154
Misc. 281, 286, 277 N.Y.S. 81, 85 (New York County Sup. Ct. 1934); Dudek v. Pittsburgh
City Firefighters, 425 Pa. 233, 240, 228 A.2d 752, 755 (1967); Spayd v. Ringing Rock
Lodge No. 665, 270 Pa. 67, 69-70, 113 A. 70, 71-72 (1921). See also supra notes 158-61;
Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76
HARV. L. REV. 983, 1006-07 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law].
181. See Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 244-46, 635 P.2d at 116-17 (1981). See
also Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-
57 (1976); Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 296-98, 517 P.2d 911, 924-25 (1974). See also
supra notes 158-61. See generally Comment, supra note 167.
182. See Zelenka v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 129 N.J. Super. 379,
384-85, 324 A.2d 35, 37, cert. denied, 66 N.J. 317, 331 A.2d 17 (1974); Developments in
the Law, supra note 180, at 1056-57. See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431
(1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958); Abernathy,
The Right of Association, 6 S.C. L. REV. 32, 44 (1953).
183. See generally Zelenka v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 129 N.J.
Super. 379, 324 A.2d 35, cert. denied, 66 N.J. 317, 331 A.2d 17 (1974) (member acting as
individual in communication to other members); Gallaher v. American Legion, 154 Misc.
281, 277 N.Y.S. 81 (New York County Sup. Ct. 1934) (post publicly took a stand con-
trary to national body); Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge No. 665, 270 Pa. 67, 113 A. 70
(1921) (member acting as an individual in communication to legislature in petition).
184. See Zelenka v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 129 N.J. Super. 379,
386, 324 A.2d 35, 38, cert. denied, 66 N.J. 317, 331 A.2d 17 (1974); Gallaher v. American
Legion, 154 Misc. 281, 286, 277 N.Y.S. 81, 85 (New York County Sup. Ct. 1934). See also
Developments in the Law, supra note 180, at 996-97, 1009, 1011-19.
185. See Zelenka v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 129 N.J. Super. 379,
388, 324 A.2d 35, 39, cert. denied, 66 N.J. 317, 331 A.2d 17 (1974); Gallaher v. American
Legion, 154 Misc. 281, 286, 277 N.Y.S. 81, 85 (New York County Sup. Ct. 1934); Dudek
v. Pittsburgh City Firefighters, 425 Pa. 233, 244, 228 A.2d 752, 757 (1967). See also
Developments in the Law, supra note 180, at 1008.
186. See Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abu-
sive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1406-07 (1967); Carroll, Pro-
tecting Private Employees' Freedom of Political Speech, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 38-39
(1981); McCarry, The Contract of Employment and Freedom of Speech, 9 SYDNEY L.
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and social dependence of employees on their jobs and the imbal-
ance in the employer-employee bargaining position, employees
may be unable to protect their own rights when, as is often the
case, the option to quit and find comparable work elsewhere is
not a viable alternative."8 7 Thus, the extent of employees' speech
rights is an area that is likely to be litigated in the future. When
a private employer suppresses speech, courts may be asked to
consider the rights to speak and receive information"88 as well as
such factors as whether the speech seriously interferes with the
management of the employer's business 89 and whether the exer-
cise of speech is on company time or at company expense. 90
These are only a few examples of situations in which courts
may have to consider whether speech rights will prevail over the
interests of a private party in suppressing speech and only a few
of the factors that courts may take into account in deciding such
cases. Whether the speech interests will prevail over the inter-
ests of the person who suppresses the speech or vice versa will,
of course, depend on the facts of each case.
XI. CONCLUSION
The textual, historical, and public policy considerations dis-
cussed in this Article support the view that the Washington
Constitution does and should protect against private infringe-
ment of free speech rights. The Alderwood Associates plurality
employed an accomodation test that provides a workable and
highly flexible framework for determining when such protection
REV. 333, 333-34 (1981); Note, Freedom of Speech in Private Employment: Overcoming
the "State Action" Problem, 20 AM. Bus. L.J. 102, 103 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Freedom of Speech]; Note, Free Speech, supra note 3, at 526-28. See generally
O'Connor, Accommodating Labor's Section 7 Rights to Picket, Solicit, and Distribute
Literature on Quasi-Public Property with the Owners' Property Rights, 32 MERCER L.
REV. 769 (1981).
187. See Blades, supra note 186, at 1404-06; Carroll, supra note 186, at 38-39;
McCarry, supra note 186, at 337; Note, Freedom of Speech, supra note 186, at 103; Note,
Free Speech, supra note 3, at 528, 553. See generally O'Connor, supra note 186.
188. See, e.g., Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 244-46, 635 P.2d at 116-17. See
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 908-10, 592 P.2d 341, 346-47, 153
Cal. Rptr. 854, 859-60 (1979). See also Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 757 (1976); Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 296-98,
517 P.2d 911, 924-25 (1974). See generally Comment, supra note 167.
189. See Note, Freedom of Speech, supra note 186, at 109; Note, Free Speech,
supra note 3, at 533-36, 547-48.
190. See Note, Freedom of Speech, supra note 186, at 109; Note, Free Speech,
supra note 3, at 537-38, 547-48.
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is appropriate while avoiding unreasonable infringement on
other potentially conflicting rights and interests. Concepts
mature and the process of accommodation will be influenced and
honed as new perspectives arise. This approach provides one
effective way of implementing our founders' promise that every
Washingtonian may "freely speak, write and publish on all
subjects." '191
191. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5.
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